The NBI in the wider African context: comparing and contrasting cooperation on the continent.

Yes, the alliteration was unintentional. As soon as I realised this blog was actually going to affect my grade for this year, I stopped the jokes. Sad, I know...
In this post I wish to place the cooperation, or lack thereof, between the Nile River riparians into context. I want to compare the NBI to other transboundary cooperation initiatives in order to assess how effective and successful it has and can be.
 
First we look to the Lake Chad Basin, which covers 8 countries: Algeria, , Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, Central African Republic, Lybia and Cameroon. Although Asah (2015: 37) notes that equity is at the heart of 'fostering cooperation and managing conflict in transboundary water management', the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), their answer to the NBI, is arguably far from equitable in its operations. The LCBC unfairly favours Nigeria, given that Abuja provides 52% of the commissions budget, drawfing second place Cameroon , which provides 26%. It is perhaps on the data front that Nigeria are strongest.  Given their technological advancement, the less developed riparians 'rely on data provided by Nigeria' (Asah 2015: 41), and thus they hold sway over the issue

Moreover, Nigeria enjoys a far greater military strength compared to the other riparians, giving it another edge over them in this already unbalanced hydropolitical situation. To top this off, Asah (2015: 41) explains that: 'The Executive Secretary of the LCBC is customarily from Nigeria, with significant implications on the conduct of hydropolitics within the basin'. If this is starting to seem a little off to you, it's because it is. Nigeria, like with Egypt and the Nile,  is so socially and economically invested in the water resources of the Lake Chad Basin that it cannot afford to be equitable and share it with another 7 countries.

But I hear you asking, how is Nigeria's monopoly over the Lake Chad Basin any different from Egypt's monopoly over the Nile River? Well, for one, Nigeria does not make any chronological claims or cite any old agreements; they simply use their military and economic might to get their own way. For another, Egypt isn't monopolising and seeking to undermine the NBI using underhanded tactics, as Nigeria seem to be doing in the case of the LCBC. Whatever Egypt's thoughts about it and all its boycott and outcries, the NBI provides all its other member states with a legitimate and cooperative forum through to manage the Nile's resources. This sets it apart from the LCBC, which seems only to serve only Nigeria, despite the fact that CAR provides over 90% of the lake's water.

I'll end this post with a look at another of Africa's transboundary basins: the Niger Basin. The Niger Basin Authority (NBA) is more like the NBI than the LCBC. It is an intergovernmental body which was created in 1964, but refounded in November 1980 (Milich and Varady 1998). The NBA has 9 members: Guinea, Cote d’lvoire, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad (ibid). The organisation has been quite active and in this way is, again, more like than the NBI than the LCBC. Like the NBI, the NBA created a 'Shared Vision' in the form of an SDAP, or Sustainable Development Action Program (Andersen et al 2005). As the aforementioned authors note, the SDAP will 'create a framework for enhanced cooperation among the Basin countires' (ibid: xi) and thus facilitate transboundary dialogue and management.

So, there. In this post I've presented two case studies, one very much like the NBI and one unlike. I suppose the only difference between the NBI and NBA that seems immediately apparent to me is that no country seems to be actively dissenting to talks and cooperation, as with Egypt in the case of the NBI. In sum, this comparison has helped me see the NBI in a new light: both as similar to other transboundary water management organisations on the continent and thus as a positive contributor to a much-needed movement and paradigm in Africa; but also different to other bodies, such as the LCBC, and thus as more effective than them and a shining example to the continent.

Until next time!



List of references:

Asah, S. (2015) 'Transboundary hydro-politics and climate change rhetoric: an emerging hydro-security complex in the lake chad basin', WIREs Water, 2, 37-45.

Milich, L. and R. Varady (1998) 'Managing Transboundary Resources: Lesson from River-Basin Accords', Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 40, 8, 10-15.

Andersen, I., O. Dione, M. Jarosewich-Holder, J. Olivry and K. Golitzen (2005) The Niger River Basin: A Vision for Sustainable Management, World Bank: Washington, D.C.

One River. 437 million People. Loads of Visions: 'Realistically' assessing the Nile Basin Initiative.

Is it this header on the NBI's website far too optimistic?

Perhaps not. After all, Egypt attended its first NBI meeting in five year earlier this year (Daily News Egypt 2015), at a conference held in Khartoum, Sudan. This ended their long boycott of meetings since the Entebbe agreement was signed, much to Egypt's ire, in 2010.Yes it may have been because their close buddies, the Sudanese, invited them and hosted, but, hey, it's progress! So let us assess the NBI for all its merits, but not forgetting its shortcomings. For starters, in its website's FAQ section, no question mentions 'Egypt' or the clear problems and conflicts the Initiative has faced both in its infancy and to this day. Not as transparent as I had hoped, and quite delusional to be honest. But let's not dwell on petty details.

In case you've somehow forgotten, here's the Nile basin once again

The Nile Basin Initiative was created in 1999 and sets out to provide 'riparian countries with the only all-inclusive regional platform for multi stakeholder dialogue, information sharing as well as joint planning and management of water and related resources in the Nile Basin' (NBI 2015a: n/p). It aims to achieve 'socio-economic' development in the region, as well as promote the 'equitable utilization' of the river (NBI 2015a). It has split opinion in academic circles, with some being understandably wary of it and momentarily skeptical (see, Salman 2013), yet Belay et al (2013: 15-16) lauded it as 'the most comprehensive and complex management plan ever attempted for sustainable development of international transboundary rivers'.

Following in this vein, in this blog post I'd like to be a bit more optimistic. So I'm going to hold off on the Egypt-bashing so we can celebrate some of the NBI's achievement's and look also to their ongoing projects.

The NBI's objectives as seen on their website (Source: NBI 2015a)

Writing in 2003, Ruedi Kung posed that the NBI should and did approach the tense and charged situation in the Nile Basin with pragmatism and realism. He argues that to have expected the organisation to 'immediately address...  the share of water each country should receive' would have been 'erroneous' (Kung 2003: 6). So what form did this pragmatic approach to 'build confidence', to use Kung's (2003: 6) phrase, take? 

A current project by the name of 'Nile Cooperation for Results' (NCORE), is a two-year program which is part of the NBI's long-term 'Strategic Plan' for 2012-2016. However, it is first and foremost the first phase of five-year 'Nile Basin Climate Resilient Growth Program'. The project aims to strengthen 'the platform for cooperation and knowledge based analysis of transboundary options' regarding cooperative planning, development and management (NBI 2015b: n/p). The project also aims to divert resources towards sustainable development initiatives and focus on dam safety.

Prior to this, the Shared Vision Program (2004-2009) had succeeded in promoting an 'integrated and comprehensive approach to the management and development of the common Nile Basin water resources' (NBI 2015b: n/p). The project had cost the member states around $136 million, far more expensive than the NCORE so far, but rewarded the NBI by promoting dialogue, something which is at the core of this 16 year-old partnership (Teshome 2009).

I'll end the post here, with some of Bey et al's (2013: 16) concluding remarks, which I think put it better than I ever could:

'... [the] NBI is a paramount historical regional partnership in this new millennium as regards transboundary river basin management. This joint venture among the Nile Basin countries has created a “regional environmental-development interface think-tank” which is a vital mechanism for paving way to greater integrated water resource management that could result into mutual benefit of all without discrimination or favourism [sic]'.


 Until next time!







List of references:

Daily News Egypt (2015) http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/02/22/egypt-participates-nile-basin-initiative-first-time-5-years/

Nile Basin Initiative (2015a) http://www.nilebasin.org/

Nile Basin Initiative: NBI Basin wide projects (2015b) http://www.nilebasin.org/index.php/about-us/nbi-basin-wide-projects

Belay, A., H. Semakula, G. Wambura and L. Jan (2013) 'SWOT Analysis and Challenges of Nile Basin Initiative: An Integrated Water Resource Management Perspective', Chinese Journal of Population Resources and Environment, 8, 1, 8-17.

Kung, R. (2003) 'Addressing the Dimensions of Transboundary Water Use: The Nile Basin Initiative', Mountain Research and Development, 23, 1, 4-6.

Salman, S. (2013) 'The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement: a peacefully unfolding African spring?', Water International, 38, 1, 17-29

Teshome, W. (2009) 'Transboundary Water Cooperation in Africa: The Case of the Nile Basin Initiative', Review of General Management, 2, 129-138.