The NBI in the wider African context: comparing and contrasting cooperation on the continent.

Yes, the alliteration was unintentional. As soon as I realised this blog was actually going to affect my grade for this year, I stopped the jokes. Sad, I know...
In this post I wish to place the cooperation, or lack thereof, between the Nile River riparians into context. I want to compare the NBI to other transboundary cooperation initiatives in order to assess how effective and successful it has and can be.
 
First we look to the Lake Chad Basin, which covers 8 countries: Algeria, , Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, Central African Republic, Lybia and Cameroon. Although Asah (2015: 37) notes that equity is at the heart of 'fostering cooperation and managing conflict in transboundary water management', the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), their answer to the NBI, is arguably far from equitable in its operations. The LCBC unfairly favours Nigeria, given that Abuja provides 52% of the commissions budget, drawfing second place Cameroon , which provides 26%. It is perhaps on the data front that Nigeria are strongest.  Given their technological advancement, the less developed riparians 'rely on data provided by Nigeria' (Asah 2015: 41), and thus they hold sway over the issue

Moreover, Nigeria enjoys a far greater military strength compared to the other riparians, giving it another edge over them in this already unbalanced hydropolitical situation. To top this off, Asah (2015: 41) explains that: 'The Executive Secretary of the LCBC is customarily from Nigeria, with significant implications on the conduct of hydropolitics within the basin'. If this is starting to seem a little off to you, it's because it is. Nigeria, like with Egypt and the Nile,  is so socially and economically invested in the water resources of the Lake Chad Basin that it cannot afford to be equitable and share it with another 7 countries.

But I hear you asking, how is Nigeria's monopoly over the Lake Chad Basin any different from Egypt's monopoly over the Nile River? Well, for one, Nigeria does not make any chronological claims or cite any old agreements; they simply use their military and economic might to get their own way. For another, Egypt isn't monopolising and seeking to undermine the NBI using underhanded tactics, as Nigeria seem to be doing in the case of the LCBC. Whatever Egypt's thoughts about it and all its boycott and outcries, the NBI provides all its other member states with a legitimate and cooperative forum through to manage the Nile's resources. This sets it apart from the LCBC, which seems only to serve only Nigeria, despite the fact that CAR provides over 90% of the lake's water.

I'll end this post with a look at another of Africa's transboundary basins: the Niger Basin. The Niger Basin Authority (NBA) is more like the NBI than the LCBC. It is an intergovernmental body which was created in 1964, but refounded in November 1980 (Milich and Varady 1998). The NBA has 9 members: Guinea, Cote d’lvoire, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad (ibid). The organisation has been quite active and in this way is, again, more like than the NBI than the LCBC. Like the NBI, the NBA created a 'Shared Vision' in the form of an SDAP, or Sustainable Development Action Program (Andersen et al 2005). As the aforementioned authors note, the SDAP will 'create a framework for enhanced cooperation among the Basin countires' (ibid: xi) and thus facilitate transboundary dialogue and management.

So, there. In this post I've presented two case studies, one very much like the NBI and one unlike. I suppose the only difference between the NBI and NBA that seems immediately apparent to me is that no country seems to be actively dissenting to talks and cooperation, as with Egypt in the case of the NBI. In sum, this comparison has helped me see the NBI in a new light: both as similar to other transboundary water management organisations on the continent and thus as a positive contributor to a much-needed movement and paradigm in Africa; but also different to other bodies, such as the LCBC, and thus as more effective than them and a shining example to the continent.

Until next time!



List of references:

Asah, S. (2015) 'Transboundary hydro-politics and climate change rhetoric: an emerging hydro-security complex in the lake chad basin', WIREs Water, 2, 37-45.

Milich, L. and R. Varady (1998) 'Managing Transboundary Resources: Lesson from River-Basin Accords', Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 40, 8, 10-15.

Andersen, I., O. Dione, M. Jarosewich-Holder, J. Olivry and K. Golitzen (2005) The Niger River Basin: A Vision for Sustainable Management, World Bank: Washington, D.C.