Recapping with the help of A. P. Demin

This week's blog will be quite brief and focus on A. P. Demin's 2015 paper in Geography and Natural Resources entitled 'Distribution of Water Resources: A Case Study of the Transboundary Nile River'. I tried getting a picture of Demin but all that Google Images gives me is images of jeans. So... moving swiftly on.

The last few posts have tried to make sense of the situation in Africa with regards to the Nile. I have put it into the wider context regarding climate change and water scarcity, spoken about some of the disputes between riparians, and last time I spoke about how we might begin to think about divvying up the river. But the thing is that Demin (2015) has done that better, so let's review his paper.



This would all be much easier if we could just share the Nile like this (Source: My fantastic Paint capabilities)


1) Demin starts by looking at the 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, an agreement which he calls one of the 'most important documents' (2015: 198). The Helsinki agreement was based on the reasonable and equitable use of water resources. Some of the factors used to determine reasonable and equitable use include: 'the geography of the basin', 'the hydrology of the basin', 'the past utilization of the waters of the basin' and 'the economic and social needs of each basin State' (Demin 2015: 198). You'd think that this agreement would hold sway over the Nile debacle but it doesn't, Egypt must be using it selectively. If we were to solve the Nile problem by assessing 'the contribution of water by each basin State' (Demin 2015: 198) then we know who'd win - Sudan obviously (see Figure 1)! But Egypt makes chronological claims, citing that they've been using it for far too long to simply give up or lessen its claim.
 

Figure 1 (Source: unknown)


2) The existing framework regarding Nile sharing is inadequate. After all, Demin notes the following: 'The existing international-legal regime does not constitute an effective tool for development and optimal use of the river’s water resources, because most of the region’s countries are not involved therein' (2015: 199). Below is a list of the main international agreements on the Nile River, and they make for grim reading for anyone other than Egypt (and Sudan maybe). It took 51 years, from the 1959 Egypt-Sudan agreement to the 2010 Nile Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA) to bring about any form of actual cooperation in the region.


Figure 2: The main international agreements on the Nile River (Source: Demin 2015)

3) Demin concludes his paper by saying that 'the problem of regulation and use of the waters of the transboundary Nile river is highly multifaceted' (2015: 204). He notes that whilst international law dictates that all Nile riparians should enjoy the river equitably and reasonably, de facto practices means that this is patently not the case.

And that's how I'll end this post, on the point that the solution to the problems in the Nile isn't easy. We shouldn't trust those who say this has an easy solution - years and years of back and forth talks and negotiation tells us just the opposite. This is insanely complex, what with all the hydrology claims, chronology claims, riverine integrity claims, territorial claims, etc...

What is simple, however, and indeed quite salient, is that this is a problem which needs to a COOPERATIVE approach and solution. No longer can Egypt lead the region into a state where it is profiting at the expense of the rest of the riparian nations. To ensure this, initiatives such as the CFA need as much support as they can get.

Until next time!

Kofi Annan once warned the world that competition over fresh water may soon become a source of war in the future. An African continent without legitimate and effective water agreements may be the battleground for such a war sooner rather than later.















List of references:

Demin, A. (2015) 'Distribution of Water Resources: A Case Study of the Transboundary Nile River', Geograhy and Natural Resources, 36, 2, 198-205.

Devising equitable allocations within the context of the Nile: grounds for despair, or reasons for hope?

Yes, I stole that title (kinda) from Arun P. Elhance (2000), but here's your citation, Mr Elhance.
As Aaron Wolf noted in 1999, the issue of 'equitable' allocations lies at 'the heart of most international water conflicts'  (Wolf 1999: 3). As such, it is a problem which plagues the Nile river basin and all its riparian nations: Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt.

Egypt's seat at the signing of the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework sits empty, a symbol of their lack of interest in talks over the equitable sharing of the Nile (Source: NTV Kenya 2010).

In this following post I wish to provide a critical reading of both papers cited above, and hopefully fit then into the context of the Nile basin. Having done so, we can see what equitable allocations may look like in this case and discuss initiatives which advocate for them.

Let us first put this issue into an appropriate context. As may have become apparent in my last post, Egypt (and Sudan too) is adamant on its position as top dog of the Nile - maintaining what Elhance (1999: 69) termed a 'colonial-era mentality' - and remains uncooperative in talks which seek to (rightfully) undermine the authority and powers of the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian agreement (see previous post for a discussion of said agreement). That's the context; while transboundary hydropolitics and hydro-diplomacy beg dialogue, Egypt almost always refuses to be part of it. As you can see, we are carrying on where we left off last week in terms of Egypt-bashing - water surprise! (I'll see myself out...)

As well as this, although as previously mentioned these water disputes have been occurring for over 50 years now, recent climate change has increasingly politically charged water in Africa. As Elhance (2000: 201) notes, water is becoming 'increasingly scarce, economically prized... and environmentally degraded', leading to what Kalron (2010) labels a ''transparent gold' rush'. Thus, given the current climate (no pun intended) on the continent, water that is transboundary in nature is especially problematic. After all, Elhance (2000: 203) rightly predicted that the 'complexity of hydroplitics multiplies as the nationally available water resources are depleted... and as the demand for water... keeps growing.'

Now that the context is out of the way, let me discuss Elhance (2000) and Wolf's (1999) papers for a while, always in the context of the Nile basin. Elhance (2000) argues first and foremost how hydropolitics is a wildly unpredictable and inherently complex. He notes that riparians must all be willing to negotiate, and his paper relies on this assumption (or maybe hope is the better word). However, we know this to not be the case with the Nile Basin. Although there have yet been no direct armed conflicts between countries in the basin, this is not tantamount to peace in the area (Mekonnen 2011), let alone cooperation. Egypt, and Sudan for that matter, are not famous for their willingness to negotiate, as was demonstrated with their contempt regarding the 2010 Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA). Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda all signed the agreement at a meeting in Entebbe, Uganda (BBC News 2010), yet Egypt and Sudan voiced opposition to it despite the fact that they were members of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI).

So now that we know Egypt isn't up for talking (unless it directly benefits them, see last post), what does Wolf (1999) propose?

Sisi doing his best to look happy about finally agreeing with Ethiopia on something (Source: News Ghana 2015)

Well, to be honest this is even more bleak. As if the 1997 UN Convention wasn't complex enough, existing agreements in the Nile context through up even more problems. Essentially, while upstream countries want to battle the power of the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian agreement, Egypt holds fast to it, arguing that it cannot lose a single drop of its allowance given its heavy reliance on the river.

The Convention doesn't help in this respect, or in the case of devising equitable allocations between riparian, or 'watecourse' as the Convention terms them, states. Articles 5 and 7 seem to be in direct conflict, with the former advocating 'equitable' and 'reasonable' use of water resources, and the latter dictating that any form of use is fine so long as 'appropriate measures' are in place to 'prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States' (UN Convention 1997). So while one is for a equity and sustainability approach, the other is for a free-for-all scenario which also (I'm sure reluctantly) bears in mind other countries' interests. Given this, the Convention is 'somewhat vague and even contradictory' in terms of its guidelines on equitable allocations (Wolf 1999: 14).

So that's how this week's blog comes to an end, on a bleak note, as is becoming my habit it seems. But this is very much a contemporary and current issue. Although as of yet the only guidelines pertaining to allocations of the Nile exist in 1929 Anglo-Egyptian agreement (NTV Kenya 2010),

CFA signatories look extremely happy given they've just stuck it to Egypt and Sudan (Source: NTV Kenya 2010)

guidelines which give the lion's share to Egypt, ongoing initiatives seek to repudiate this agreement and move towards a future in which the world's longest river serves all 11 riparians equally and sustainably. So for the time being, this post on the state of Nile hydropolitics gives both grounds for despair and reasons for hope. You weren't expected that double whammy were you?

Until next time!

Kofi Annan once warned the world that competition over fresh water may soon become a source of war in the future. An African continent without legitimate and effective water agreements may be the battleground for such a war sooner rather than later.




























List of references:

NTV Kenya (2010) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ge6tVv2ZKQI#t=71

Kalron, N. (2010) 'A 'transparent gold' rush?', African Security Review, 19, 3, 110-113.

Elhance, A. (1999) Hydropolitics of the Third World: Conflict and Cooperaiton in International River Basins, Washington, D.C: United States Institure of Peace Press.

Elhance, A. (2000) 'Hydropolitics: Grounds for Despair, Reasons for Hope', International Negotiation, 5, 201-222.

Wolf, A. (1999) 'Criteria for equitable allocations: the heart of international water conflict', Natural Resources Forum, 23, 3-30.

Mekonnen, D. (2011) 'Between the Scylla of Water Security and Charybdis of Benefit Sharing: The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement – Failed or Just Teetering on the Brink?', Goettingen Journal of International Law, 3, 1, 345-372.
BBC News (2010) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8682387.stm

News Ghana (2015) http://newsghana.com.gh/egypts-president-addresses-ethiopias-parliament

The Grand Rennaisance Dam and hydropolitical tensions over the Nile

So here is the blog post in which I finally narrow down, or at least attempt to. Richard told us to go 'narrow and deep' rather than 'wide and shallow', so here goes:

This picture is crying out for a '#takemeback #tb' post on Instagram (Source: Rough Guides 2015)

The Nile River: One river. 11 countries. 4,132 miles. 300 million people. A ton of disputes. That's the deal with the Nile in a nutshell. Its basin spans 3.4 million square kilometers, from Egypt in the north to Tanzania in the south, sparking conflicts every step of the way (see Figure 1) (Encyclopedia Britannica 2015).

Figure 1: The Nile River Basin in all its glory (Source: Rough Guides 2013)

As it is the recurring leitmotif of the Nile's history, this tendency for conflict and dispute is a worthy candidate for academic work. Historians, geographers, policy makers, and political scientists have all flocked to study and analyse, as well as suggest possible solutions (Dinar 2012). But don't worry, they ain't got nothing on me.

First we must look at why the Nile is a source of conflict and even potential war (as Egypt's former President Mohammed Morsi suggested) (Rahman 2012). Why can't a resource be shared between 11 countries? What's the big deal? Well to put it simply, Egypt has monopolised the Nile since... since... basically forever. And this has caused some tension - and 'tension' is a massive understatement when this life-sustaining liquid is concerned. Some Greek bloke called Herodotus told them that Egypt was the 'gift of the Nile' and they took that WAY too seriously (Kendie 1999). Today, over 80% of the water Egypt uses annually comes from the Blue Nile (Kendie 1999). The irony here is that Blue Nile originates in Lake Tana, Ethiopia. Therein lies the conflict.

Ethiopia is not alone, Uganda, Sudan and Kenya have all voiced complaints about Egypt's domination of the river's resources. Born out of this was the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), a  'joint program of action whose aim is to ensure cooperation and economic integration, sustainable resource development and security', created in 1999 (Teshome 2009: 130). Prior to this, international brokers such as the World Bank had taken charge of ensuring dialogue between the riparian nations (ibid). Prior to that, a 1929 agreement existed between Sudan and Egypt (who, back then, were ruled as one country),  giving the lion's share of the Nile's water to said countries (Kung 2003; African Research Bulletin 2010). It was actually this old agreement (which was revised in 1959) that led to the formation of the NBI; upstream countries were discontent with the share of the water they were receiving and the fact that they had to ask Egypt for permission to construct dams or other structures that could alter river flow. Usually the upstream countries are those who hold the power, like Turkey with the Tigris river, but British colonial rule meant that Egypt had total control of the river (New York Times 2010). In the Nile scenario, the upstream countries label this agreement an 'unfair vestige of colonialism' (ibid: n/p). And right they are.

The NBI sought to contest the 1929 agreement, and it has four main objectives:
1) To develop the Nile River water resources in a equitable and sustainable manner in order to ensure prosperity, security and peace for the inhabitants.
2) To guarantee effective water management and optimal resources use.
3) To promote cooperation and combined action between member countries.
4) To combat poverty and promote economic integration (Sileet et al 2007, cited in Teshome, 2010: 131).

The most significant contribution made by the NBI was the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), which by March 2015 had been signed by six countries and ratified by three (NBI 2015). The CFA hopes to establish 'principles, rights and obligations to ensure long-term and sustainable management and development of the shared Nile waters' (NBI 2015: n/p), and is backed by Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania among others. As expected, Egypt completely rejects the CFA, clinging on to the belief that it has some sort of God-given right to the Nile, continuously touting the 1929 as proof.

However, whatever progress was arguably made could be said to have been all in vain due to the polemical debate surrounding Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam (Figure 2). Ethiopia's plans to construct the dam greatly angered Egypt, with some officials even heard on TV discussing bombing the structure if it were to be built (Bahrenegash 2013). Although it is still in the process of being built, the dam will be Africa's largest hydroelectric power plant and largest dam, standing at 170 metres and being able to hold 70 billion cubic meters of water (CCTV Africa 2014). Ethiopia hope that it will greatly boost the country's energy security, with the dam being able to generate 6,000 megawatts (ibid). While Egypt claimed that the dam would decrease the amount of water that reached its borders, Ethiopia argued that its construction was vital to the country's development, and that in fact the dam may even improve water flow to Egypt by reducing evaporation at Lake Nasser (Al Jazeera 2014)

Figure 2: The location of the dam (Source: BBC News 2015)

Despite this, in 2014 the Egyptian government demanded that the project be halted - Ethiopia, understandably, politely declined (Al Jazeera 2014; Bloomberg 2014). Cue back and forth talks, delegates moving to and fro, and the desperate use of diplomacy as both countries held that they preferred that over conflict. And... voila! Earlier this very year, Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt signed a deal 'designed to ease fears that a controversial new dam could spark a regional conflict' (Euro News 2015: n/p). The deal even gives Egypt preferential treatment when the dam's HEP capabilities become fully functional, and it doesn't seem like Egypt has made any concessions with regards to the water it demands a right to. It seems this agreement merely abated Sisi, momentarily appeasing him.

Although this seems resolved, this is perhaps only temporary. The dam is just over halfway complete and could spark further conflict in the future before it is completed in 2017, and maybe even after! I say this because the words of President Sisi on the occasion of the signing of the agreement seem oddly threatening: 'You [Ethiopia] will develop and grow and I am with you, but be aware that in Egypt the people live only on the water that comes from this river...' (Euro News 2015).

I may not be likely to give Egypt the benefit of the doubt after having spent hours reading about how greedy and downright arrogant they can be when it comes to hydro-diplomacy, but that sure does sound like a veiled threat to me.

Until next time!

Check this video out if the Grand Renaissance dam interests you. I really doubt a dam will interest you enough to watch a YouTube video that's 29 minutes long but, hey, at least I tried!

Kofi Annan once warned the world that competition over fresh water may soon become a source of war in the future. An African continent without legitimate and effective water agreements may be the battleground for such a war sooner rather than later.








  
List of references:

Encyclopedia Brittanica (2015) http://www.britannica.com/place/Nile-River

Rough Guides (2013) http://www.roughguides.com/article/great-rivers-of-the-world-the-nile/

Kendie, D. (1999) 'Egypt and the Hydro-Politics of Blue Nile River', Northeast African Studies, 6, 141-169.

Dinar, S. (2012) 'The Geographical Dimensions of Hydro-politics: International Freshwater in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia', Eurasian Geography and Economics, 53, 1, 115-142.

Teshome, W. (2009) 'Transboundary Water Cooperation in Africa: The Case of the Nile Basin Initiative', Review of General Management, 2, 129-138.

Africa Research Bulletin (2010) 'Nile Basin Initiative: Contentious Issue', Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series, 47, 6, 18724-18725.

Kung, R. (2003) 'Addressing the Dimensions of Transboundary Water Use: The Nile Basin Initiative', Mountain Research and Development, 23, 1, 4-6.

New York Times (2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/world/middleeast/26nile.html?_r=2&ref=world

Rahman, M. (2012) 'Water Security: Ethiopia–Egypt Transboundary Challenges over the Nile River Basin', Journal of Asian and African Studies, 48, 1, 35-46.

Nile Basin Initiative (2015) http://nilebasin.org/index.php/about-us/the-nb-cooperative-framework

Bahrenegash (2013) http://bahrenegash.com/?p=news&ref=495

CCTV Africa (2014) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RD72UStS-yI

Al Jazeera (2014) http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/2/egypt-disputes-ethiopiarenaissancedam.html

Bloomberg (2014) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-08/ethiopia-rejects-egyptian-proposal-on-nile-as-dam-talks-falter

Euro News (2015) http://www.euronews.com/2015/03/23/egypt-ethiopia-and-sudan-sign-deal-on-nile-dam-