The Grand Rennaisance Dam and hydropolitical tensions over the Nile

So here is the blog post in which I finally narrow down, or at least attempt to. Richard told us to go 'narrow and deep' rather than 'wide and shallow', so here goes:

This picture is crying out for a '#takemeback #tb' post on Instagram (Source: Rough Guides 2015)

The Nile River: One river. 11 countries. 4,132 miles. 300 million people. A ton of disputes. That's the deal with the Nile in a nutshell. Its basin spans 3.4 million square kilometers, from Egypt in the north to Tanzania in the south, sparking conflicts every step of the way (see Figure 1) (Encyclopedia Britannica 2015).

Figure 1: The Nile River Basin in all its glory (Source: Rough Guides 2013)

As it is the recurring leitmotif of the Nile's history, this tendency for conflict and dispute is a worthy candidate for academic work. Historians, geographers, policy makers, and political scientists have all flocked to study and analyse, as well as suggest possible solutions (Dinar 2012). But don't worry, they ain't got nothing on me.

First we must look at why the Nile is a source of conflict and even potential war (as Egypt's former President Mohammed Morsi suggested) (Rahman 2012). Why can't a resource be shared between 11 countries? What's the big deal? Well to put it simply, Egypt has monopolised the Nile since... since... basically forever. And this has caused some tension - and 'tension' is a massive understatement when this life-sustaining liquid is concerned. Some Greek bloke called Herodotus told them that Egypt was the 'gift of the Nile' and they took that WAY too seriously (Kendie 1999). Today, over 80% of the water Egypt uses annually comes from the Blue Nile (Kendie 1999). The irony here is that Blue Nile originates in Lake Tana, Ethiopia. Therein lies the conflict.

Ethiopia is not alone, Uganda, Sudan and Kenya have all voiced complaints about Egypt's domination of the river's resources. Born out of this was the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), a  'joint program of action whose aim is to ensure cooperation and economic integration, sustainable resource development and security', created in 1999 (Teshome 2009: 130). Prior to this, international brokers such as the World Bank had taken charge of ensuring dialogue between the riparian nations (ibid). Prior to that, a 1929 agreement existed between Sudan and Egypt (who, back then, were ruled as one country),  giving the lion's share of the Nile's water to said countries (Kung 2003; African Research Bulletin 2010). It was actually this old agreement (which was revised in 1959) that led to the formation of the NBI; upstream countries were discontent with the share of the water they were receiving and the fact that they had to ask Egypt for permission to construct dams or other structures that could alter river flow. Usually the upstream countries are those who hold the power, like Turkey with the Tigris river, but British colonial rule meant that Egypt had total control of the river (New York Times 2010). In the Nile scenario, the upstream countries label this agreement an 'unfair vestige of colonialism' (ibid: n/p). And right they are.

The NBI sought to contest the 1929 agreement, and it has four main objectives:
1) To develop the Nile River water resources in a equitable and sustainable manner in order to ensure prosperity, security and peace for the inhabitants.
2) To guarantee effective water management and optimal resources use.
3) To promote cooperation and combined action between member countries.
4) To combat poverty and promote economic integration (Sileet et al 2007, cited in Teshome, 2010: 131).

The most significant contribution made by the NBI was the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), which by March 2015 had been signed by six countries and ratified by three (NBI 2015). The CFA hopes to establish 'principles, rights and obligations to ensure long-term and sustainable management and development of the shared Nile waters' (NBI 2015: n/p), and is backed by Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania among others. As expected, Egypt completely rejects the CFA, clinging on to the belief that it has some sort of God-given right to the Nile, continuously touting the 1929 as proof.

However, whatever progress was arguably made could be said to have been all in vain due to the polemical debate surrounding Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam (Figure 2). Ethiopia's plans to construct the dam greatly angered Egypt, with some officials even heard on TV discussing bombing the structure if it were to be built (Bahrenegash 2013). Although it is still in the process of being built, the dam will be Africa's largest hydroelectric power plant and largest dam, standing at 170 metres and being able to hold 70 billion cubic meters of water (CCTV Africa 2014). Ethiopia hope that it will greatly boost the country's energy security, with the dam being able to generate 6,000 megawatts (ibid). While Egypt claimed that the dam would decrease the amount of water that reached its borders, Ethiopia argued that its construction was vital to the country's development, and that in fact the dam may even improve water flow to Egypt by reducing evaporation at Lake Nasser (Al Jazeera 2014)

Figure 2: The location of the dam (Source: BBC News 2015)

Despite this, in 2014 the Egyptian government demanded that the project be halted - Ethiopia, understandably, politely declined (Al Jazeera 2014; Bloomberg 2014). Cue back and forth talks, delegates moving to and fro, and the desperate use of diplomacy as both countries held that they preferred that over conflict. And... voila! Earlier this very year, Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt signed a deal 'designed to ease fears that a controversial new dam could spark a regional conflict' (Euro News 2015: n/p). The deal even gives Egypt preferential treatment when the dam's HEP capabilities become fully functional, and it doesn't seem like Egypt has made any concessions with regards to the water it demands a right to. It seems this agreement merely abated Sisi, momentarily appeasing him.

Although this seems resolved, this is perhaps only temporary. The dam is just over halfway complete and could spark further conflict in the future before it is completed in 2017, and maybe even after! I say this because the words of President Sisi on the occasion of the signing of the agreement seem oddly threatening: 'You [Ethiopia] will develop and grow and I am with you, but be aware that in Egypt the people live only on the water that comes from this river...' (Euro News 2015).

I may not be likely to give Egypt the benefit of the doubt after having spent hours reading about how greedy and downright arrogant they can be when it comes to hydro-diplomacy, but that sure does sound like a veiled threat to me.

Until next time!

Check this video out if the Grand Renaissance dam interests you. I really doubt a dam will interest you enough to watch a YouTube video that's 29 minutes long but, hey, at least I tried!

Kofi Annan once warned the world that competition over fresh water may soon become a source of war in the future. An African continent without legitimate and effective water agreements may be the battleground for such a war sooner rather than later.








  
List of references:

Encyclopedia Brittanica (2015) http://www.britannica.com/place/Nile-River

Rough Guides (2013) http://www.roughguides.com/article/great-rivers-of-the-world-the-nile/

Kendie, D. (1999) 'Egypt and the Hydro-Politics of Blue Nile River', Northeast African Studies, 6, 141-169.

Dinar, S. (2012) 'The Geographical Dimensions of Hydro-politics: International Freshwater in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia', Eurasian Geography and Economics, 53, 1, 115-142.

Teshome, W. (2009) 'Transboundary Water Cooperation in Africa: The Case of the Nile Basin Initiative', Review of General Management, 2, 129-138.

Africa Research Bulletin (2010) 'Nile Basin Initiative: Contentious Issue', Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series, 47, 6, 18724-18725.

Kung, R. (2003) 'Addressing the Dimensions of Transboundary Water Use: The Nile Basin Initiative', Mountain Research and Development, 23, 1, 4-6.

New York Times (2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/world/middleeast/26nile.html?_r=2&ref=world

Rahman, M. (2012) 'Water Security: Ethiopia–Egypt Transboundary Challenges over the Nile River Basin', Journal of Asian and African Studies, 48, 1, 35-46.

Nile Basin Initiative (2015) http://nilebasin.org/index.php/about-us/the-nb-cooperative-framework

Bahrenegash (2013) http://bahrenegash.com/?p=news&ref=495

CCTV Africa (2014) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RD72UStS-yI

Al Jazeera (2014) http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/2/egypt-disputes-ethiopiarenaissancedam.html

Bloomberg (2014) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-08/ethiopia-rejects-egyptian-proposal-on-nile-as-dam-talks-falter

Euro News (2015) http://www.euronews.com/2015/03/23/egypt-ethiopia-and-sudan-sign-deal-on-nile-dam-