Devising equitable allocations within the context of the Nile: grounds for despair, or reasons for hope?

Yes, I stole that title (kinda) from Arun P. Elhance (2000), but here's your citation, Mr Elhance.
As Aaron Wolf noted in 1999, the issue of 'equitable' allocations lies at 'the heart of most international water conflicts'  (Wolf 1999: 3). As such, it is a problem which plagues the Nile river basin and all its riparian nations: Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt.

Egypt's seat at the signing of the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework sits empty, a symbol of their lack of interest in talks over the equitable sharing of the Nile (Source: NTV Kenya 2010).

In this following post I wish to provide a critical reading of both papers cited above, and hopefully fit then into the context of the Nile basin. Having done so, we can see what equitable allocations may look like in this case and discuss initiatives which advocate for them.

Let us first put this issue into an appropriate context. As may have become apparent in my last post, Egypt (and Sudan too) is adamant on its position as top dog of the Nile - maintaining what Elhance (1999: 69) termed a 'colonial-era mentality' - and remains uncooperative in talks which seek to (rightfully) undermine the authority and powers of the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian agreement (see previous post for a discussion of said agreement). That's the context; while transboundary hydropolitics and hydro-diplomacy beg dialogue, Egypt almost always refuses to be part of it. As you can see, we are carrying on where we left off last week in terms of Egypt-bashing - water surprise! (I'll see myself out...)

As well as this, although as previously mentioned these water disputes have been occurring for over 50 years now, recent climate change has increasingly politically charged water in Africa. As Elhance (2000: 201) notes, water is becoming 'increasingly scarce, economically prized... and environmentally degraded', leading to what Kalron (2010) labels a ''transparent gold' rush'. Thus, given the current climate (no pun intended) on the continent, water that is transboundary in nature is especially problematic. After all, Elhance (2000: 203) rightly predicted that the 'complexity of hydroplitics multiplies as the nationally available water resources are depleted... and as the demand for water... keeps growing.'

Now that the context is out of the way, let me discuss Elhance (2000) and Wolf's (1999) papers for a while, always in the context of the Nile basin. Elhance (2000) argues first and foremost how hydropolitics is a wildly unpredictable and inherently complex. He notes that riparians must all be willing to negotiate, and his paper relies on this assumption (or maybe hope is the better word). However, we know this to not be the case with the Nile Basin. Although there have yet been no direct armed conflicts between countries in the basin, this is not tantamount to peace in the area (Mekonnen 2011), let alone cooperation. Egypt, and Sudan for that matter, are not famous for their willingness to negotiate, as was demonstrated with their contempt regarding the 2010 Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA). Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda all signed the agreement at a meeting in Entebbe, Uganda (BBC News 2010), yet Egypt and Sudan voiced opposition to it despite the fact that they were members of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI).

So now that we know Egypt isn't up for talking (unless it directly benefits them, see last post), what does Wolf (1999) propose?

Sisi doing his best to look happy about finally agreeing with Ethiopia on something (Source: News Ghana 2015)

Well, to be honest this is even more bleak. As if the 1997 UN Convention wasn't complex enough, existing agreements in the Nile context through up even more problems. Essentially, while upstream countries want to battle the power of the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian agreement, Egypt holds fast to it, arguing that it cannot lose a single drop of its allowance given its heavy reliance on the river.

The Convention doesn't help in this respect, or in the case of devising equitable allocations between riparian, or 'watecourse' as the Convention terms them, states. Articles 5 and 7 seem to be in direct conflict, with the former advocating 'equitable' and 'reasonable' use of water resources, and the latter dictating that any form of use is fine so long as 'appropriate measures' are in place to 'prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States' (UN Convention 1997). So while one is for a equity and sustainability approach, the other is for a free-for-all scenario which also (I'm sure reluctantly) bears in mind other countries' interests. Given this, the Convention is 'somewhat vague and even contradictory' in terms of its guidelines on equitable allocations (Wolf 1999: 14).

So that's how this week's blog comes to an end, on a bleak note, as is becoming my habit it seems. But this is very much a contemporary and current issue. Although as of yet the only guidelines pertaining to allocations of the Nile exist in 1929 Anglo-Egyptian agreement (NTV Kenya 2010),

CFA signatories look extremely happy given they've just stuck it to Egypt and Sudan (Source: NTV Kenya 2010)

guidelines which give the lion's share to Egypt, ongoing initiatives seek to repudiate this agreement and move towards a future in which the world's longest river serves all 11 riparians equally and sustainably. So for the time being, this post on the state of Nile hydropolitics gives both grounds for despair and reasons for hope. You weren't expected that double whammy were you?

Until next time!

Kofi Annan once warned the world that competition over fresh water may soon become a source of war in the future. An African continent without legitimate and effective water agreements may be the battleground for such a war sooner rather than later.




























List of references:

NTV Kenya (2010) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ge6tVv2ZKQI#t=71

Kalron, N. (2010) 'A 'transparent gold' rush?', African Security Review, 19, 3, 110-113.

Elhance, A. (1999) Hydropolitics of the Third World: Conflict and Cooperaiton in International River Basins, Washington, D.C: United States Institure of Peace Press.

Elhance, A. (2000) 'Hydropolitics: Grounds for Despair, Reasons for Hope', International Negotiation, 5, 201-222.

Wolf, A. (1999) 'Criteria for equitable allocations: the heart of international water conflict', Natural Resources Forum, 23, 3-30.

Mekonnen, D. (2011) 'Between the Scylla of Water Security and Charybdis of Benefit Sharing: The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement – Failed or Just Teetering on the Brink?', Goettingen Journal of International Law, 3, 1, 345-372.
BBC News (2010) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8682387.stm

News Ghana (2015) http://newsghana.com.gh/egypts-president-addresses-ethiopias-parliament