Recapping with the help of A. P. Demin

This week's blog will be quite brief and focus on A. P. Demin's 2015 paper in Geography and Natural Resources entitled 'Distribution of Water Resources: A Case Study of the Transboundary Nile River'. I tried getting a picture of Demin but all that Google Images gives me is images of jeans. So... moving swiftly on.

The last few posts have tried to make sense of the situation in Africa with regards to the Nile. I have put it into the wider context regarding climate change and water scarcity, spoken about some of the disputes between riparians, and last time I spoke about how we might begin to think about divvying up the river. But the thing is that Demin (2015) has done that better, so let's review his paper.



This would all be much easier if we could just share the Nile like this (Source: My fantastic Paint capabilities)


1) Demin starts by looking at the 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, an agreement which he calls one of the 'most important documents' (2015: 198). The Helsinki agreement was based on the reasonable and equitable use of water resources. Some of the factors used to determine reasonable and equitable use include: 'the geography of the basin', 'the hydrology of the basin', 'the past utilization of the waters of the basin' and 'the economic and social needs of each basin State' (Demin 2015: 198). You'd think that this agreement would hold sway over the Nile debacle but it doesn't, Egypt must be using it selectively. If we were to solve the Nile problem by assessing 'the contribution of water by each basin State' (Demin 2015: 198) then we know who'd win - Sudan obviously (see Figure 1)! But Egypt makes chronological claims, citing that they've been using it for far too long to simply give up or lessen its claim.
 

Figure 1 (Source: unknown)


2) The existing framework regarding Nile sharing is inadequate. After all, Demin notes the following: 'The existing international-legal regime does not constitute an effective tool for development and optimal use of the river’s water resources, because most of the region’s countries are not involved therein' (2015: 199). Below is a list of the main international agreements on the Nile River, and they make for grim reading for anyone other than Egypt (and Sudan maybe). It took 51 years, from the 1959 Egypt-Sudan agreement to the 2010 Nile Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA) to bring about any form of actual cooperation in the region.


Figure 2: The main international agreements on the Nile River (Source: Demin 2015)

3) Demin concludes his paper by saying that 'the problem of regulation and use of the waters of the transboundary Nile river is highly multifaceted' (2015: 204). He notes that whilst international law dictates that all Nile riparians should enjoy the river equitably and reasonably, de facto practices means that this is patently not the case.

And that's how I'll end this post, on the point that the solution to the problems in the Nile isn't easy. We shouldn't trust those who say this has an easy solution - years and years of back and forth talks and negotiation tells us just the opposite. This is insanely complex, what with all the hydrology claims, chronology claims, riverine integrity claims, territorial claims, etc...

What is simple, however, and indeed quite salient, is that this is a problem which needs to a COOPERATIVE approach and solution. No longer can Egypt lead the region into a state where it is profiting at the expense of the rest of the riparian nations. To ensure this, initiatives such as the CFA need as much support as they can get.

Until next time!

Kofi Annan once warned the world that competition over fresh water may soon become a source of war in the future. An African continent without legitimate and effective water agreements may be the battleground for such a war sooner rather than later.















List of references:

Demin, A. (2015) 'Distribution of Water Resources: A Case Study of the Transboundary Nile River', Geograhy and Natural Resources, 36, 2, 198-205.